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Abstract
Browser extensions are small applications executed
in the browser context that provide additional capa-
bilities and enrich the user experience while surfing
the web. The acceptance of extensions in current
browsers is unquestionable. For instance, Chrome’s
official extension repository has more than 63,000
extensions, with some of them having more than
10M users. When installed, extensions are pushed
into an internal queue within the browser. The or-
der in which each extension executes depends on a
number of factors, including their relative installa-
tion times. In this paper, we demonstrate how this
order can be exploited by an unprivileged malicious
extension (i.e., one with no more permissions than
those already assigned when accessing web content)
to get access to any private information that other
extensions have previously introduced. Our solution
does not require modifying the core browser engine
as it is implemented as another browser extension.
We prove that our approach effectively protects the
user against usual attackers (i.e., any other installed
extension) as well as against strong attackers having
access to the effects of all installed extensions (i.e.,
knowing who did what). We also prove soundness
and robustness of our approach under reasonable as-
sumptions.
1 Introduction
Web browsers have become essential tools that are
installed on nearly all computers. The most pop-
ular browsers as of this writing (April 2018) are
Chrome (77.9%), Firefox (11.8%), Internet Explor-
er/Edge (4.1%), Safari (3.3%) and Opera (1.5%)
[18]. Most browsers allow users to install small
applications, generally developed by third parties,
that provide additional functionality or enhance the
user experience while browsing. Such plug-ins are
known as browser extensions and they interact with
the browser by sharing common resources such as
tabs, cookies, HTML content or storage capabilities.
In this paper we focus on Chromium [12], which
is an open source browser and the basis for Chrome,
Opera, Comodo, Dragon and the Yandex browser.
Extensions installed in Chromium can also run in all
mentioned browsers. The execution engine is ex-
actly the same in all the browsers and follows the
same pipeline model that will be explained in some
detail later (Section 3). For this reason, we will re-
fer to Chrome and Chromium interchangeably. Ex-
tensions in Chromium can be of three types: con-
tent scripts, background pages, or both. In what fol-
lows, our main focus is on content scripts, which are
JavaScript files that run in the context of the loaded
web page. It is important to emphasize that the main
aim of content scripts is to access and interact with
the Document Object Model (DOM). This fact alone
raises a fundamental privacy question, since it is ex-
plicitly assumed that extensions will have full access
to any (sensitive or not) content that the user is ac-
cessing. Browsers (including Chromium) dodge this
issue by assuming that the user should trust the ex-
tension before installing it. In this paper we do not
address this problem, which is essentially related to
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determining if an extension’s behavior is benign or
malicious.
When analyzing the security and privacy impli-
cations of browser extensions, one question that
has been largely overlooked is the potential leak-
age of information among extensions. In nearly all
browsers, each content script uses its own wrapper
of the DOM to read and make changes to the page
loaded by the browser. They also run in a dedi-
cated sandbox that the browser provides for security
reasons. However, there is no isolation in terms of
privacy, since all changes an extension performs in
its own DOM are automatically synchronized with
the main DOM. One straightforward—but nonethe-
less important—consequence of this is that a mali-
cious extension could eavesdrop on other extensions
(i.e., it can get access to the data they put on the
DOM and observe their actions) and even manipu-
late their behavior by acting on their DOM elements
(e.g., clicking on elements introduced by another ex-
tension). An attacker can exploit this using two dif-
ferent strategies:
1. Exploiting the order. The way Chromium
manages extensions (see Section 3) introduces
a default execution order among extensions
with undesirable consequences. One key is-
sue is that the n-th extension in the pipeline can
learn all contents introduced by the first n − 1
extensions in the HTML document. Thus, ex-
tensions located at the end of the pipeline enjoy
more privacy than ones installed earlier.
2. The order-independent attacks. Some of at-
tacks enabled by the absence of effective isola-
tion among extensions’ actions do not require
exploiting the execution order (i.e., getting the
malicious extension to be placed at the end of
the execution pipeline). However, exploiting
the order provides the attacker with a privileged
position that facilitates such attacks, which will
result in a simpler code for the malicious exten-
sion that will increase the chances of passing
the analysis performed by official stores [8].
This lack of effective isolation is not only inher-
ent to Chromium’s extension model, but also explic-
itly acknowledged. Browsers such as Chrome do
not even attempt to guarantee some form of “non-
interference” among extensions. On the contrary,
developers are encouraged to implement appropri-
ate mechanisms to protect any sensitive information
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Figure 1: Modified extension execution pipeline in
our solution.
that ends up in the DOM, since it is assumed that
other extensions could simply read or manipulate it.
Even if browsers do not factor this into their threat
model, we believe that this is a serious vulnerabil-
ity that has not been discussed before. More im-
portantly, it can be easily exploited by a malicious
extension, regardless of the fact that it is explicitly
assumed in the browser’s extension model or not.
We discuss a vulnerability inherent to the way ex-
tensions are handled in Chromium, formalize this
problem in terms of knowledge gained by the at-
tacker and propose a solution that provides practical
security isolation among extensions and does not re-
quire altering the core browser engine. The key idea
is to replace the extension pipeline by a (simulated)
parallel execution model in which all extensions re-
ceive the same input page (see Fig. 1). An addi-
tional component identifies the changes introduced
by each extension and applies all of them to the orig-
inal input page. We prove properties (soundness and
robustness) of our solution and also discuss limita-
tions of this approach.
2 Chrome Browser Extensions
Events order in JavaScript. In JavaScript, the
event propagation mechanism determines in which
order an event is received by HTML elements. For
instance, when two nested elements are subscribed
to the same event and this event is fired, there are
basically two ways to propagate the event in the
DOM: bubbling and capturing. By using capturing,
the event is initially handled by the root element and
propagated to the its children. In contrast, with bub-
bling the event is initially captured and handled by
the children (leaves nodes in the DOM tree) and then
propagated to their parents.
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In JavaScript, extensions subscribe to events by
using the addEvenListener() function. In our
example above we use capturing, so the first alert()
will correspond to the <divid="1">. In case of
using bubbling, then the first alert() will corre-
spond to the <divid="2"> element.
Apart from the JavaScript event propagation
mechanism, extensions developers can define one
additional order level through a property named
run_at in the manifest.json file that allows
them to control at which moment the extension will
be injected. That property might be: document_
start, document_end or document_idle.
When the value is document_start, the exten-
sion is injected when the document element is cre-
ated. Setting it to document_end would cause
the extension to be injected when the DOM is
completed but before any other subresources are
loaded, such as e.g., images, iframes, etc. In-
ternally, Chromium loads the extension when the
DOMContentLoaded() is triggered. Finally, the
document_idle value would cause the exten-
sion to be injected after document_start and
before document_end, that is, once the page has
been created and after the DOM is loaded. Inter-
nally, Chromium loads the extension after the trigger
window.onload() is fired.
Additionally, Chrome currently works by dele-
gating to the HTML parser the way the content
scripts are inserted when they are tagged as either
document_start or document_end. Thus, if
the HTML parser schedules document_start or
document_end as tasks, then content scripts are
inserted in separate tasks. However, content scripts
tagged as document_idle are always injected in
separate tasks.
Despite of the existence of the aforementioned
strategies to control the execution order of exten-
sions, explicitly writing them does not unequivo-
cally determine the order in which they will be ex-
ecuted. Whenever two or more extensions have
the same configuration parameters, the Chrome ex-
tension engine decides which one will be executed
based on the extensions’ installation date. This be-
havior follows a FIFO policy: the oldest installed
extension will be the first to be executed whereas
the newest will be the last one to be executed.
Apart from the event management mechanism ex-
plained above, it is worth mentioning how Chrome
manages tasks and microtasks. A task—a click
event, for instance—is run in its own thread and is
composed of a set of JavaScript sentences, actions to
handle the event, which belong to the event loop. All
tasks are queued and executed sequentially. More-
over, when a setTimeout is used in the event
loop, the callback function that is executed asyn-
chronously is queued as a new task. This is specially
useful for monitoring delayed functions in browser
extensions.
Nevertheless, some operations can be also exe-
cuted in the middle of a task execution, e.g., to
make something asynchronous without being sched-
uled as a new task and queued in the tasks queue.
Those operations are called microtasks (composed
of promises and mutation observers) and are exe-
cuted intermediately after the task execution. The
main reason for this new types of queues is to en-
rich the user experience. However, microtasks are
not executed when the event loop is not empty, e.g.,
if two click events are fired using JavaScript code
and the function that handles the click event uses
promises, those microtasks will not be run until
both clicks events are executed. We refer the reader
to [3] for more information and practical examples
about how tasks, microtasks and how their execu-
tion queues work. In this work however, we are
not taking microtasks into consideration and they are
left as future work as it is mandatory to modify the
Chromium’s source code to take them under control.
Extensions in Chromium’s source code. The se-
curity model of browser extensions in Chromium is
based on isolated worlds in (JavaScript) V8. Its main
purpose is to isolate the execution of different un-
trusted content scripts (with a wrapper of the orig-
inal DOM) while keeping the main DOM structure
synchronized.
Essentially, a world is a “concept to sandbox
DOM wrappers among content scripts” [5]. Each
world has its own DOM wrapper, yet there might be
different instances from one particular world and,
thus, all of them would share the same Blink C++
DOM object. The main reason for this partition
is that instances belonging to the same world can-
not share DOMs but can share C++ DOM objects,
i.e., no JavaScripts can be shared between different
worlds but C++ DOM objects can be, thus permit-
ting to run untrusted content scripts on shared DOM.
Roughly speaking, in terms of browser extensions
3
Blink
DOM Object
V8
Isolated World (Content Scripts)Main World
DOM 
Wrapper
DOM 
Wrapper
DOM 
Wrapper
Main Thread
CS1 CSN
DOM Object
Worker Thread
DOM 
Wrapper
Worker World
Figure 2: Browser Extensions Architecture in
Chromium
this world concept means that the content scripts of
each extension will run its own JavaScripts over dif-
ferent DOMs. However, all these DOMs are syn-
chronized so that all changes made by each indi-
vidual JavaScript will automatically be sent to other
DOMs (other wrappers and the main DOM the user
sees).
According to the official documentation, V8 has
three different worlds: a main world, an isolated
world and a worker world. A main world is where
the original DOM with all its original scripts are
executed. An isolated world is where the content
scripts of the extensions are executed—all of them
can access the main DOM through Blink C++ shared
objects. Finally, a worker world is associated with
threads in such a way that each isolated world is as-
sociated with one worker, i.e., the main thread is the
main world plus each of the content scripts. Figure
2 represents how Chrome manages and isolates con-
tent scripts of browser extensions.
Overall, this isolation mechanism prevents
Chrome from being vulnerable to attacks such as the
one recently demonstrated in [14] against Firefox,
whose security model lacks isolation. Nevertheless,
Chrome’s security model has not considered privacy
between extensions as part of its architecture. This
allows, for instance, that if the Pinterest extension
inserts a <span> element on each picture contained
in the DOM, then all these changes will automati-
cally be visible to the rest of the extensions, regard-
less of whether they run in isolated worlds. This ob-
servation is the basis for the attack discussed in this
paper.
3 Attacker Model
Chromium manages all installed extensions through
the class ExtensionRegistry which is implemented in
extension_registry.cc and the associated header file
extension_registry.h. This class implements meth-
ods to add, remove or retrieve all extensions that
for a particular browser context have been enabled,
disabled, blocked, blacklisted, etc. Each set of ex-
tensions is internally managed through the Exten-
sionSet class implemented in extension_set.h and ex-
tension_set.cc. This is just a standard C++ map to
manage sets with methods to insert, remove and re-
trieve items. Importantly, it also provides a standard
C++ iterator to enumerate all set elements. Overall,
this means that installed extensions in Chromium are
placed in a pipeline and are called sequentially to
inject the content script(s) in the DOM. Apart from
that, the position at which the browser injects con-
tent scripts is determined by a number of factors:
1. First, by the implicit order declared in the
run_at property in the manifest.json file.
2. If two or more extensions have the same run_at
value, the browser tries to determine their exe-
cution order using the JavaScript event propa-
gation mechanism [9].
3. Finally, if the event propagation order is the
same, extensions are executed according to
their installation time: A executes before B if
B was installed after A.
This pipeline works as follows. The content script
of the first extension is inserted and then it is exe-
cuted in an isolated world by using the method ex-
ecuteScriptInIsolatedWorld (see [5] for more details
about worlds in Chrome). The output of an exten-
sion is automatically synchronized with the shared
DOM, so when the next extension is executed its
wrapper DOM already contains all the changes that
previous extensions have made.
3.1 Manipulating the execution
pipeline
We assume that the attacker gets one malicious
extension at the end of the execution pipeline.
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Even if the extension is not the last to be in-
stalled, Chromium’s extensions model provides var-
ious mechanisms that an attacker can exploit to
modify the order in which parts of the extension
code will run. For example, a malicious extension
can be marked to run once the DOM is loaded. This
is achieved by setting the run_at property to doc-
ument_end in the manifest.json file. Additionally,
the extension can use the capturing JavaScript event
propagation property to force that the fired event
would execute the extension in the return journey of
the event propagation (check [9] for further details
about this). Moreover, modifying the default execu-
tion order could be done by following two different
approaches:
1. Through another extension’s management per-
missions, similarly to what the Extensity ex-
tension does [4]. Essentially, this extension
enables and disables extensions automatically
in the browser. The attacker will disable all
installed extensions and then re-enable them
again, but putting the malicious extension at the
end. For this to work in practice, the user must
explicitly approve the malicious extension re-
quirement to extend its permissions (namely,
management). Since many users do not pay
attention to requested permissions, this could
guarantee success for the attacker.
2. Modifying the Secure Preferences file. This
is a JSON configuration file that was initially
thought to be modified only by the browser
[1]. However, Chrome allows developers to
distribute extensions as part of other software
so this file could also be externally modified by
other processes. This is the basis for most of
the malware installed in the browser because
of its deficient security [6]. The attacker can
thus modify the install_time property in the Se-
cure Preferences file, and put her extension at
the end of the pipeline. See [16] for a detailed
explanation on how to modify the manifest file.
3.2 Attack examples
To exemplify the problem, we tested the attack
in a Chrome browser with four extensions already
installed: Pinterest, Evernote, vidIQ Vision for
YouTube and our custom extension. Our mali-
cious extension subscribes to all possible JavaScript
events in the browser (i.e., in the web page context).
This guarantees that the extension will always be ex-
ecuted whenever any event is fired.
The official extension of Pinterest, which has
more than 10M users, parses the entire content and
adds hidden <span> elements on each picture it
finds in the DOM, as well as some Cascading Style
Sheets (CSS) elements. When the user triggers the
onmouseover() event by passing the mouse pointer
over a picture, the span becomes visible in the form
of a button and, if the user clicks on it, the picture
is automatically shared on her Pinterest board. As-
sume now that the user has some “secret boards” de-
fined in her Pinterest account to avoid sharing pic-
tures with all the world. Our malicious extension
can carry out the following actions:
1. It can add a listener to the same onclick() event
to know which pictures the user adds to her ac-
count, and thus the photos will no longer be pri-
vate.
2. It can learn what pictures the user likes and it
could share that information to an advertise-
ment company [19].
3. It could generate a click JavaScript event on
each picture, automatically sharing all pictures
in the user’s account without any confirmation
pop-up.
4. It can replace the picture the user wants to share
by another one.
Evernote Web Clipper has currently more than
4.5M users. The extension parses the web page and
inserts some CSS code and hidden <span> elements
on each picture contained in the DOM. Additionally,
it adds a contextual menu when the user performs a
right click either on a single tag or in the whole doc-
ument. Using this contextual menu, the user can add
items such as meetings, personal notes, or any other
information to her calendar. Our malicious exten-
sion can subscribe to the click events and, in addition
to the attacks described for the Pinterest scenario, it
could also learn all details about the notes or calen-
dar entries added by the user.
Finally, we tested it againts vidIQ Vision for
YouTube. This extension has more than 500,000
users. Among other actions, it inserts a <div> el-
ement in the right banner of the screen when a user
visits Youtube in order to provide her with richer in-
formation and track her viewed videos. When the
user visits Youtube for the first time, this extension
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asks her for her username and password (as a mat-
ter of fact, all extensions subscribed to either onkey-
down(), onkeypress() or onkeyup() events may get
both the username and password). Our malicious
extension, apart from getting the username and pass-
word, could also get all viewed videos and profile
the user’s habits.
3.3 Modeling extension effects
Before formally defining our attacker model, we first
introduce some notation and definitions. In what fol-
lows, E = 〈E1, . . . , Ei, . . . , En〉 (n > 0)1 will de-
note the “set” of extensions already installed in the
browser, where the index indicates their default exe-
cution order (i.e., E1 is the first to be executed).
When extensions are executed, they have an ef-
fect. For our purposes, we split such effects into
two parts: a functional effect that is reflected on
the changes done to the DOM the extension acts
on, and some side-effects that are not directly re-
flected in the DOM (e.g., sending information to
other servers, interacting with the browser, execut-
ing external scripts, etc.). The functional effect of
an extension Ei when applied to a DOM will be
denoted by fi(DOM) = DOMi. In this paper we
are only concerned about the functional effect of
DOMs, so all the results that follow only apply to
what extension can do on the DOMs and, thus, no
claim is done concerning extensions’ side-effects.
Extensions can perform four different types of
high-level operations while being executed: inser-
tions, deletions, updates, and simply doing nothing.
Definition 1. Let E = 〈E1, . . . , Ei, . . . , En〉 with
n > 0, be the set of extensions that a browser has al-
ready installed and DOM0 the original content pro-
vided as input. We define the execution pipeline as
the result of the execution of the n extensions as
composite functions: fn ◦ . . .◦f1(DOM0) = DOMn.
DOMs can be seen as trees [2]. We will use this
fact to define the above operations in terms of oper-
ations on trees. Thus, if extension Ei only inserts el-
ements in the DOM, then fi(DOM) = DOMi where
DOM is a subtree of DOMi. In case Ei only deletes
something from DOM, then fi(DOM) = DOMi,
where DOMi is a subtree of DOM. Finally, if Ei
1All the discussion below assumes that there is at least one
extension installed.
only updates DOM, then fi(DOM) = DOMi where
DOM is equal to DOMi except for the field that has
been updated.2
We assume a tree operation that allows us to
compare DOMs and give us the difference between
them: DOM - DOM’. Moreover, we say that DOM
is smaller or equal than DOM’ (denoted DOM ≤
DOM’) if and only if DOM is a subtree of DOM’.3
Finally, we say that the default knowledge of an
extension is the amount of information it can get
from the DOM at the moment of its execution. Note
that the actual knowledge of an extension might not
be equal to the default knowledge.
Definition 2. Let E = 〈E1, . . . , Ei, . . . , En〉 with
n > 0 be as before, DOM0 the original content, and
EV = {ev1, ev2, . . . , evn} the set of events that
DOM0 can fire. We define the default knowledge
of an extension Ei as K(Ei) = {DOM0 | ∃e ∈
EV · e = load()} ∪ {DOMi−1} for 1 < i ≤ n, and
K(Ei) = {DOM0} if i = 1. We say that an ex-
tension Ej knows at least as much as extension Ei
(1 ≤ i, j ≤ n) if and only if K(Ei) ⊆ K(Ej). We
also define an order between extensions concerning
the DOM they have direct access to: Ei v Ej , if
and only if the resulting DOM after executing both
extensions is such that DOMi ≤DOMj .
Note that the real knowledge of an extension
might not be equal (and neither a subset nor a su-
perset) of the default knowledge. The reason is that,
as we will see, this knowledge might be affected by
attacks or by a solution to those attacks. The concept
is in any case useful as it characterises what the ex-
tension knows by default, if no external interference
is added to the expected behavior of how the browser
works. On the one hand, if we have an execution
pipeline such that the functional effect of all of them
is only insertions or doing nothing. We say that the
execution pipeline is monotonic with respect to the
structure of the DOM (or simply, that it is mono-
tonic). We have then the following proposition con-
cerning monotonic execution (sub)pipelines. The
proof is trivial.
Proposition 1. Given a sequence of extensions 〈E1,
. . . , Ej , . . . , Eh, . . . , En〉 (with n > 0) such that
2Note that, to avoid over-formalization, we are not giving for-
mal definitions for these operations in terms of trees as they are
rather intuitive.
3We define <, >, and ≥ as expected.
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the subsequence 〈Ej , . . . , Eh〉 is monotonic, then
Ei−1 v Ei for j < i ≤ h.
If an execution pipeline is such that the overall
functional effect of all extensions is only insertions
or doing nothing, we say that the execution pipeline
is monotonic with respect to the structure of the
DOM (or simply, that it is monotonic). Conversely,
if any extension Ei in the execution pipeline deletes
or updates information, then it is generally impossi-
ble to make any statement about whether any other
extension knows more or less than Ei. For instance,
an extension Ei−1 could delete something while ex-
tension Ei adds it back, in which case any other ex-
tension Ej (j > i) will not be able to detect that
there has been a deletion in the past.
3.4 Attacker model
We consider two different types of attackers: strong
and usual attackers. Intuitively, a strong attacker is
a malicious extension that has access to the output of
all executions in the pipeline. Note that this provides
the attacker not only with the effect of all extensions,
but also with knowledge about which extension did
what. Alternatively, a usual attacker is a browser
extension that only has access to the corresponding
DOM that the extension receives as input when it is
executed (plus the original DOM). More formally:
Definition 3. A strong attacker (As) is an exten-
sionEAs that is interleaved in the execution pipeline
such that fAs◦fn◦fAs◦· · ·◦fAs◦f1◦fAs(DOM) =
DOMn. This is the strongest attacker because it
can know all the changes that all extensions have
performed. A usual attacker (Au) is an extension
EAu that is executed in the j−th position of the
pipeline (j ≤ n) such that fn ◦ . . . ◦fAu ◦ · · ·
◦f1(DOM0) = DOMn, having the default knowl-
edge any other extension in position j could have.
Note that j > 1 as otherwise the attacker would
learn nothing.
A strong attacker has definitively more knowl-
edge than any other in the pipeline and can thus
take advantage of that. Note that, in particular, a
strong attacker gets to know which extension did
what changes since it can calculate the effect of each
extension. The usual attacker can only infer par-
tial information about the other extensions by diff-
ing DOM0 and the DOMAu that it receives as input.
However, this attacker will know neither the num-
ber of extensions nor which operations they have
performed over the content. Note that the gain of
knowledge is not much over previous extensions ex-
cept if DOMAu is part of a monotonic subsequence
(cf. Proposition 1).
An interesting consequence of our threat model is
that all extensions which are installed on the browser
are potential usual attackers because they might have
access to the original DOM and to the input DOM
received from the previous extension in the execu-
tion pipeline (cf. Definition 2).
Remember that despite our proposed attack might
be performed without exploiting the order, i.e., a
malicious extension could subscribe to all possible
events in the DOM, the amount of needed source
code to tackle all possible privacy attacks would be
incredibly huge and infeasible due to the amount of
possible extensions and attacks.
In this work, we remark the existence of this se-
curity threat which is transparent even for the au-
tomatic static analysis of the source code that offi-
cial repositories perform [8]. Notice that by using
our attack, the simplest dummy extension installed
just after, for instance the official Pinterest exten-
sion, would detect the existence of the former one
and thus, it can communicate to an external server
to retrieve the customized exploit performing thus
an adaptive attack.
Additionally, our scenario can handle situations
where, two browser extensions developed by the
same person or company but placed for instance
at the beginning and at the end of the execution
queue will actually access to different information
and thus, collaborate to perform attacks like browser
hijacking [19, 13], or fingerprinting [15, 10] attacks.
4 Our solution
Our solution introduces the notion of a monitor ex-
tension, whose goal is to prevent regular extensions
from learning from each other. Intuitively, monitor
extensions are used to detect all changes that an ex-
tension makes; log those modifications; delete them
from the DOM passed on to the next extension in the
execution pipeline; and, at the end of the pipeline,
merge all changes to produce a final DOM. Figure 3
shows the four main components of our scheme:
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Figure 3: Architecture of our solution and its four
main modules.
• The Diff module takes a pair of DOMs (namely,
(DOMi−1, DOMi) and performs the difference
between them (Diff=DOMi - DOMi−1).
• The Store module is shared between all moni-
tor extensions and collects all changes in a ta-
ble. This table can be seen as a patches table
with the following format: <Operation>, <Po-
sition>, <Action>.
• The Del module removes all changes from
DOMi, that is, DOMi = DOMi−1 - Diff.
• The Apply module, which is placed at the end
of the pipeline, takes all stored differences and
patches the DOM by applying them in order.
Note that our solution could be simplified by re-
moving the Del method. Thus, once the difference
has been computed, the DOM passed on to the next
extension would be just the original DOM (DOM0).
However, by implementing a Del module, our ap-
proach is more general since it allows to introduce
some policies to share limited amounts of informa-
tion among extensions. This point, however, is not
further explored in this work.
More formally, this solution implements the
following transformation over the input DOM :
fEfinal ◦ fEn ◦fEmonin−1 ◦ . . . ◦ fEmoni1 ◦fE1
◦fEinitial(DOM0) = DOMn. The information flow
is as follows. Assume that Alice accesses a web
page. The browser requests the URL and, once the
DOM0 tree is retrieved, the first isolated world cor-
responding to the initial extension (Einitial) is exe-
cuted. This first extension is not part of the general
solution (see Figure 3), but we found out that, when
we tried to implement it in a real setting, it is needed
because Chrome—and other browsers in general—
do some pre-processing to the DOM (e.g., closing
forgotten open HTML tags, adding some mandatory
HTML tags or changing everything into lower case).
This initial extension does not add any changes to
the DOM. We note that an extension can request the
same content directly by using the XMLHttpRequest
JavaScript object, but the received DOM could be
completely different from the current DOM because
of that browser pre-processing.
After that, the output of the initial extension
DOM0 and the rest of the DOMs wrappers are syn-
chronized. At this point, the first official extension
is run and may perform some actions over the con-
tent. The resulting (DOM1) is the input to the next
monitor extension, plus the initial DOM (DOM0)
needed to get the difference between both DOMs:
Diff=DOM1-DOM0. All the possible resulting val-
ues of this operation are stored (Store) for the fi-
nal post-processing (patch operation), and the dif-
ference Diff is then removed from the output of the
extension DOM1. It is worth noting that this new
DOM will be equal to the original DOM in most
cases, i.e., our solution will be valid whenever the
execution pipeline follows a monotonic sequence.
This process is repeated until the last official ex-
tension eventually produces the final DOMn output.
This last DOM is then provided as input to the fi-
nal extension (Efinal), which will take all stored
changes and will apply them to the DOMn, thus gen-
erating the final document.
4.1 Advantages, properties and limita-
tions of our approach
How intrusive is our solution? That is, how much
of the extensions’ (good and expected) behavior do
we modify while achieving our goal of preserving
privacy? Our solution always preserves the behavior
of the original browser execution model (i.e., the fi-
nal output with or without our solution is exactly the
same). In some sense, we do want to make sure that
the order of execution is irrelevant with respect to
the knowledge the extensions should get (i.e., not ac-
cessing sensitive information they are not allowed to
as an effect of this information being passed by other
extensions), but we also know that the outcome of
the executions of such extensions might be modified
by our approach eventually modifying some of the
expected output. Let us consider an example show-
ing the possible effects of our solution. Let Ei be an
extension that changes the DOM’s background color
to black (let us assume the original color was white
and that there is text both in black and blue). Let
us consider that a later extension in the execution
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pipeline, Ej (1 ≤, i < j ≤ n) changes the back-
ground color to white. It is clear that in the current
order, the final outcome is that the DOM’s back-
ground color is white and all the text is readable.
That being said, it is clear that in case the extensions
were executed in different order (first Ej and then
Ei) the outcome will be very different: not only the
background will be black (instead of white), which
by itself does not seem to be a big deal, but more
importantly there will be some text not visible to the
user. This not only affects the usability of the DOM
(the black background will hide all the black text so
the user will not be able to see it), but may intro-
duce some security issues (the hidden text might be
clicked accidentally producing undesired effects).
This is however, an inherent behavior of the
browser and our proposed solution does not mod-
ify the default behavior of the browser, i.e., a given
HTML content looks the same with a set of ex-
tensions enabled and with the same set and the
proposed solution. Moreover, JavaScript periodi-
cal tasks such as setInterval(callback, delay) are not
covered in detail with our solution. This method
automatically enqueues the function defined in the
callback in the task queue. For instance, if the ex-
tension A uses this method to get all password fields
from the page the user is visiting each 2 seconds.
This is a completely different scenario because the
execution of this task cannot be controlled through
JavaScript code alone.
Does our solution indeed mitigate possible at-
tacks? According to the definitions given in Sec-
tion 3, the knowledge of an extension executed in
position j (1 < j ≤ n) is the same knowledge
as the previous extension (Ej−1) in the pipeline
plus the actions that Ej−1 performs over the DOM
(DOMj−1 ∪ DOMj). On the contrary, when we
measure the knowledge of an extension with our so-
lution, it is thus decreased to DOM0 (given that our
solution only passes the original DOM to each ex-
tension). Our solution also mitigates a strong at-
tacker by limiting what she gets to know in the same
way as for the usual attacker: our interleaving guar-
antees that a strong attacker only gets to know the
original DOM. The reduction in knowledge is of
course more significant than in the usual attacker
(Section 3).
How robust is the approach? That is, can we guar-
antee that a strong attacker cannot bypass our solu-
tion? One may think that a strong attacker could at-
tack our solution by interleaving extensions between
our monitor extensions (before and after) thus by-
passing our protection in order to get access to the
effects of the installed extensions before being mod-
ified by our monitor extensions, and then restoring
it after our modification. To do so, the attacker must
create an extension with the management privileges.
That, however, would only be possible if the user
explicitly grants that permission to the attacker. The
best we can do is then to show a warning message
to the user as soon as we detect the presence of such
malicious extension and rely on that the user blocks
the attacker. If the user grants the permission, we are
thus vulnerable to the attack. In order for our pro-
posed solution to be able to detect the presence of
such attacks our extension would need to have man-
agement privileges. This could only be granted by
the user at installation time.
Proposition 2. Our extension-based solution is ro-
bust against strong attackers under the assumption
that our (initial, middle and final) monitor exten-
sions are given management privileges, and that the
user does not explicitly give management privileges
to the attacker.
In case the user (accidentally or consciously)
gives the needed privileges for a strong attacker to
install his extensions, our solution would be able to
detect that and communicate it to the user. Indeed,
a strong attacker would need to install n + 1 exten-
sions interleaved between any two extensions, and
our monitor extensions would be able to detect that.
So, we have a way to detect this issue, notify it, and
ask the user to uninstall the extension. Besides, by
identifying this we would be able to keep a black list
of malicious extensions.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that most of the
aforementioned questions would be solved by mod-
ifying the Chromium’s source code. Note that an
attacker might insert as many extensions as desired
and could even alter the execution order. By modi-
fying the source code, all extensions receive a fresh
copy of the original HTML and, thus, no-one will
learn about the actions executed by other extensions.
This solution uses a similar approach but requires
modifying (and recompiling) the core of Chromium
to achieve a real isolated execution. At a logical
level, it works exactly the same as the general so-
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lution depicted in Figure 3.
5 Experimental results
We have studied the following performance indica-
tors according to [7] as well as the W3C consortium
[17]: 1. memory consumption; 2. time needed to
parse the HTML; 3. when the onLoad event is fired
(many JavaScript files wait for this event); 4. the
processing time which means that all resources have
been loaded (DOM is completed i.e., the loading
spinner has stopped spinning), and; 5. a final test
to show the total time that Chrome needs to gen-
erate the onLoad event, i.e., the page is ready. All
the experiments but the memory consumption were
carried out accessing the Alexa’s Top 30 web sites
and averaging the results over 50 runs. Additionally,
in order to measure all the time-based metrics, we
have used the DevTools profiling tools provided by
the browser.
Our extension based solution inserts a middle
monitor extension between every two original ex-
tensions, plus the initial and the final ones. Thus,
the number of total extensions is 2n+ 1 (n original
extensions plus n+ 1 added monitor extensions, in-
cluding the initial and final ones). In order to test
what impact these additions have on both Chrome’s
performance and the user experience, we have in-
stalled a set of original extensions in a MacBook Air
with 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU and 8 Gb of RAM.
The Chrome version where all test have been run is
60.0.3112.78 (Build official) (64 bits). We used the
10 most downloaded browser extensions from the
Chrome Web Store, since according to [11], the av-
erage number of installed extensions per user is 5.
All figures related to the monitor extensions de-
pend on the number of original extensions installed
in the browser (2n + 1). In our experiments, the
number of extensions is related to the original ex-
tensions installed. This number varies if the exper-
iment is performed by using the original extensions
or our proposed solution. For instance, when we
say that with 5 extensions it takes 1.3 seconds to
load all the scripts of a entire page, it means that
in reality there are 11 extensions installed in the
browser: 5 original extensions, plus 4 middle ex-
tensions, plus 1 final extension, plus 1 initial exten-
sion. On the contrary, 5 extensions on the original
#Extensions Originally Solution #Extensions Originally Solution
2 217,9Kb 255,0Kb 7 420,9Kb 513,1Kb
3 331,6Kb 379,7Kb 8 492,0Kb 595,2Kb
4 348,7Kb 407,9Kb 9 504,3Kb 618,5Kb
5 374,1Kb 444,2Kb 10 527,1Kb 652,3Kb
6 392,1Kb 473,3Kb
Table 1: RAM Consumption
extension experiment means that only the 5 origi-
nal extensions are installed in the browser. Addi-
tionally, for all the experiments we have measured
times without the browser’s cache and by launch-
ing one new, fresh instance per experiment, i.e., we
have closed and opened Google Chrome each time
we added a new browser extension to measure RAM
consumption and user experience times.
5.1 RAM Consumption
To measure memory consumption, we have used the
developer tools provided by Chrome. Table 1 shows
the impact on the browser performance in terms of
RAM consumed in KB. We have isolated the execu-
tion of the original extensions and the monitor ex-
tensions in order to show that the impact of our pro-
posed solution is almost negligible in comparison to
the performance of the original extensions. More-
over, both the initial and the final extension consume
13 KB of RAM each, whereas our monitor exten-
sions consume 11 KB of RAM on average. These
extensions differ considerably from extensions such
as AVG Web TuneUp, AdBlock or Ad Block Plus,
which consume 27.6 KB, 190.3 KB, and 11.3 KB
of RAM on average, respectively. Note that the size
of such extensions depends in fact on the content of
the web page. For instance, a page containing a sub-
stantial amount of advertisements would make Ad
Block to consume much more memory. From the
results we can conclude that the impact of our solu-
tion is approximately linear in the number of exten-
sions. More concretely, our proposed solution de-
creases performance by a factor of 1.15 per installed
extension in terms of RAM.
5.2 Impact on user experience
Figure 4a shows the time that Chrome needs to parse
the HTML. At this point, Chrome has already parsed
the entire HTML file and creates the DOM. We can
observe that, in the worst case (for 10 original exten-
sions), our solution introduces a delay of 5000ms.
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Figure 4: Evaluation of our proposal according to W3C parameters
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Similarly, Figure 4b shows the time needed for the
browser to fire the event onLoad. This event is crit-
ical because most of the extensions, jquery, and all
libraries based on jquery wait for that event to be ex-
ecuted. From the results it is remarkable that the in-
clusion of our solution does not introduce undesired
delays in the execution of this event in comparison
to the default behavior.
The processing time measures when all resources
have been loaded. Currently, the way the user knows
when a given page has been totally loaded is when
the spinner at the core of most browsers stops spin-
ning. There are a bunch of external parameters that
directly affect this time, such as the network over-
head or the number of resources previously stored
in the cache, among many others. All in all, we
can conclude that the number of installed extensions
has a potentially large impact on performance and,
therefore, in the processing time as it is depicted in
Figure 4c. This, however, is only relatively critical
as the average number of installed extensions is very
low for most users.
Finally, Figure 4d shows the time needed to load
the whole web page. The total time is calculated
from the sum of processing and load times. This
plot, together with the ones discussed before, show
that content scripts of browser extensions are not
totally decoupled from the rendering process and,
therefore, they directly impact performance and user
experience.
In general, our solution increases very moderately
the amount of time Chrome needs to render the con-
tent. This problem might be solved by modifying
the browser’s source code.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed one important secu-
rity and privacy implication of Chromium’s exten-
sion model: the effects of one extension are visible
to others in the execution pipeline. This can be ex-
ploited by a malicious extension that can, for exam-
ple, get access to sensitive information or manipu-
late the DOM elements introduced by other exten-
sions. We call this a usual attacker, in contrast to a
strong attacker who has access to the effect of each
single extension in the execution pipeline. A strong
attacker may, in particular, install itself as the last
extension in the pipeline and produce many copies
interleaving itself in between all other extensions.
In this way, it could be possible to get to know what
all other extensions are doing and exploit this fact.
We have shown examples on how to perform both a
usual and a strong attack.
We have provided a proof-of-concept to address
this problem which relies on replacing the pipeline
execution model by one in which each extension ex-
ecutes in isolation, and then combine all individual
effects to create the final DOM. Our implementation
does this through a set of monitor extensions. As a
first approach we decide to take the effect of the last
extension in the pipeline. We could, however, easily
provide a solution based on user intervention (ask-
ing the user to decide) or to apply a different pol-
icy (choose the first one, or non deterministically).
A more refined way to do so is left as future work
(e.g., one could gather information on how harmful
the effects are, rank them and choose the less harm-
ful using machine learning algorithms).
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